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HIPAA CONFUSION: HOW THE PRIVACY RULE
AUTHORIZES "INFORMAL" DISCOVERY
I.

INTRODUCTION

The year was 1995, and Jane Smith had a rewarding job as a stock
clerk at Dave & Hubbard's Grocery Store. One day while Jane is
restocking the dairy shelves, she slips and falls on a puddle of milk
she spilled, landing firmly on her back. Unable to move, Jane is
immediately taken to the hospital. Struggling to diagnose the
ailment, the treating physician, Dr. Dolin suggests immediate
surgery, to which Jane agrees. After the surgery, Jane is in just as
much pain as she was prior to the surgery, and is subsequently
diagnosed with a herniated disk. After being discharged from the
hospital, and consulting with her attorney Mr. Jones, Jane decides
that she wants to pursue legal action against Dr. Dolin for medical
malpractice, and Dave & Hubbard's Grocery Store for negligence.
Jane files a complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, a contributory negligence state. l Dave &
Hubbard's Grocery Store retains Mrs. Y as its counsel and she
immediately begins sorting through discovery in an effort to develop
a winnable defense. Mrs. Y notices that Jane visited Dr. Brown, a
chiropractor, several times leading up to the incident and decides to
pursue the lead. Complying with a recognized Maryland discovery
practice, Mrs. Y places an initial phone call to Dr. Brown. After the
initial call, Dr. Brown agrees to meet with Mrs. Y outside the
presence of Mr. Jones and Jane. During her ex parte interview with
Dr. Brown, Mrs. Y discovers that Jane suffered the herniated disk
three years prior to the incident and has not followed Dr. Brown's
rehabilitative advice, including his suggestion that she wear a back
brace at work. During the trial, Mrs. Y calls Dr. Brown to testify, and
ultimately the jury absolves both Dr. Dolin and Dave & Hubbard's
Grocery Store of all liability. Fast forward to 2014.
Over the course of the past decade, ex parte communications
between defense attorneys and plaintiffs' non-party treating
1.

See, e.g., Harrison v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 451, 456 A.2d
894, 898 (1983) ("[T]he well-established law of [Maryland is] that a plaintiff who
fails to observe ordinary care for his own safety is contributorily negligent and is
barred from all recovery, regardless of the quantum of a defendant's primary
negligence." (citing Schweitzer v. Brewer, 280 Md. 430, 439-40, 374 A.2d 347,353
(1977))).

491

492

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 44

physicians have become almost nonexistent, a direct result of the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
("HIPAA,,)2 and its Privacy Rule. 3 Prior to the promulgation of
HIP AA, several jurisdictions4 allowed defense attorneys to
informally communicate ex parte with plaintiffs' non-party treating
physicians as though they were ordinary fact witnesses. 5 However,
with the passage of HIPAA, and subsequently its Privacy Rule,6
access to personally identifiable health information underwent an
overhaul subjecting such information to more stringent regulations. 7
Following the full implementation of HIPAA and the Privacy Rule
in April 2003,8 there has been tremendous inconsistency in their
application9 and interpretation. 1O As a result of these conflicting
dispositions, defense attorneys in some jurisdictions are barred from
using a discovery tool that is liberally allowed elsewhere. 11 Per one
court's astute observation, "[t]he recently enacted HIPAA statute has

2.

3.
4.

5.

6.
7.

8.
9.

10.
11.

HIPAA was signed into law by President Clinton on August 21, 1996. Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.c. §§ 1320d-l to d-9 (2012».
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2014); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d(l)-(9).
Jurisdictions previously allowing ex parte communications with treating physicians
include: Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho,
Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Wisconsin, Rhode Island. Scott
Aripoli, Comment, Hungry Hungry HIPAA: Has the Regulation Bitten Off More Than
it Can Chew by Prohibiting Ex Parte Communication with Treating Physicians?, 75
UMKC L. REV. 499, 505-06 (2006).
Melissa Phillips Reading & Laura Marshall Strong, Ex Parte Communications
Between Defense Counsel and Treating Physicians, FOR THE DEF. 30 (Oct. 2011),
http://www.og-law.comlfilesIFTD-1110-ReadingStrong.pdf.
Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS.Gov, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/
hipaa/understanding/summary/index.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2015).
Compare Butler-Tulio v. Scroggins, 139 Md. App. 122, 141,774 A.2d 1209, 1219
(2001) (finding that "when a patient puts his or her medical condition at issue in a
[lawsuit] ... a health care provider must disclose ... all medical information [under
the Maryland Confidentiality of Medical Records Act] ... regardless of whether the
patient consents."), with Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709 (D. Md. 2004)
(stating "HIPAA preempts MCMRA and is controlling on the issue of ex parte
communications").
45 C.F.R. § 164.534(a) (2014).
See Holzle v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., Inc., 801 N.Y.S.2d 234, *5-7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 24, 2005) (finding "[t]he waiver of any HIPAA rights as implicit in the waiver of
the physician-patient privilege," thus permitting ex parte communication).
Crenshaw v. MaNY Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1029 (S.D. Cal. 2004)
("HIPAA does not authorize ex parte contacts with healthcare providers.").
See Holzle, 801 N.Y.S.2d 234, at *20-21; see also Crenshaw, 318 F. Supp. 2d at
1015.
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[forever] changed the landscape of how [all] litigators can conduct
informal discovery in cases involving medical treatment. ,,12
This Comment will demonstrate that the Privacy Rule implicitly
authorizes the exercise of ex parte communication by defense
counsel, while also showing that the informal nature of these
interviews no longer remains.I3 Part II will analyze HIPAA and the
Privacy Rule, including their origins and purpose. 14 Part III will
provide an in-depth analysis of the Privacy Rule's scope, the manner
in which physicians may disclose protected health information, and
sources of confusion with respect to disclosure.1 5 Part IV will discuss
the background of ex parte communications, and varying judicial
interpretations of the Privacy Rule as applied to ex parte
communication. 16 Finally, Part V will suggest a more standardized
reading that courts should employ when determining whether ex
parte communication is permitted, so that future judicial
nonconformity can be prevented. 17
II.

THE ORIGINS OF HIPAA AND ITS PROMULGAnON

HIPAA, codified as 42 U.S.c. § 1320d, et seq.,18 was signed into
law on August 21, 1996 by President Clinton. 19 Although HIPAA
was not primarily enacted by Congress to serve as a federal medical
privacy act/o its privacy implications have been the most far-reaching
and broadly impacting part of the legislation. According to the text
of HIP AA, its purpose was to "improve . . . the efficiency and
effectiveness of the health care system, by encouraging the
development of a health information system through the
establishment of standards and requirements for the electronic
transmission of certain health information.,,21 Despite the detailed
language of HIP AA, President Clinton, when addressing the nation,
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
I 7.
18.

19.

20.
21.

Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 711.
See infra Parts II, Ill, and IV.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part Ill.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part v.
HIP AA was formerly known as Public Law 104-191. Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.)
1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1 to d-9 (2012)).
See President William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing of the Health Insurance
of
1996
(Aug.
21,
1996),
Portability
and
Accountability
Act
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/?pid=53211.
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act § 261, 110 Stat. at 2021.
Id. (emphasis added).
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enunciated a different goal, stating "this Act will ensure the
portability of health benefits when [workers change vocation] ... and
will protect workers against discrimination by health plans.,,22
While President Clinton briefly mentioned the issue of patient
privacy in his statement regarding HIP AA,23 the privacy regulations
of HIP AA were specifically assigned to Congress and the Secretary
of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in Section
264 of the Act. 24 To accomplish the ends of HIPAA, Congress
required that HHS develop and promulgate regulations relating to the
privacy and protection of health information. 25 Although it was not
Congress's sole, or even primary, intention to protect the privacy of
certain health information, HHS recognized that HIP AA could not
fulfill its goals 26 without such patient privacy protections. 27
Tasked with the creation of "a set of basic national privacy
standards and fair information practices,,,28 HHS examined the
existing protections and rights under state law. Ultimately, the
drafters found that the existing protections under state law were
lacking in two respects: (1) they failed to establish the patients' right
to access their own health information, and (2) they failed to impose
comprehensive protections with respect to patients' medical
records. 29 In reference to a patient's health information,30 HHS

22.

23.
24.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

President William J. Clinton, supra note 19. Furthermore, President Clinton
addressed three key reforms that HIP AA would set into motion. First, it will
eliminate the possibility that individuals can be denied coverage because they have a
preexisting medical condition. Second it will require insurance companies to sell
coverage to small employer groups and to individuals who lose group coverage
without regard to their health risk status. Finally, it will require insurers to renew the
policies they sell to groups and individuals. Id.
Id.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act § 264(c)(l), 110 Stat. at 2033 ("If
[Congress failed to enact] legislation governing standards with respect to the privacy
of individually identifiable health information ... [within] 36 months after the date of
the enactment of [HIPAA], the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall
promulgate final regulations ... not later than the date that is 42 months after the date
of the enactment of[HIPAA].").
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2012).
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act § 261, 110 Stat. at 2021.
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462,82,463-64 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2014».
Id. at 82, 464.
Id. at 82, 463-64.
Health information consists of "any information, whether oral or recorded in any form
or medium, that is created or received by a healthcare provider ... and relates to the
past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of the individual .... "
42 U.S.c. § 1320d-(4) (2012); see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
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recognized the growing need for federal regulations regarding the use
and disclosure of this information by covered entities. 31 In support of
their fmdings, the drafters reaffIrmed that privacy is a fundamental
right,32 and with the advent of the Internet and electronic transmission
systems, the likelihood of unwanted disclosure was more signifIcant
than ever.33 Additionally, the drafters acknowledged that a patient's
ability to receive quality health care would be generally undermined
without sufftcient privacy protections/4 an argument frequently
utilized by opponents of ex parte communication. 35 As such, HHS
issued a proposed Privacy Rule for the public commenting process on
November 3, 1999. 36
After reviewing thousands of public comments, including criticism
that "the [Privacy Rule] too harshly restricted access to
information,,,37 HHS issued a final draft of the Privacy Rule in
December 2000, with subsequent modifications in August 2002. 38
During the fInal public commentary in December 2000, HHS
specifically addressed the issue of disclosing a patient's health
information during the course of judicial proceedings. 39 Nowhere in
the response to public comments did HHS explicitly discuss the
permissibility of ex parte communications, however, HHS did
provide several examples in which patient health information may be
31.

32.

33.
34.
35.

36.

37.

45 C.F.R. § 160.102(a)(3) (stating that a covered entity includes "[a] healthcare
provider who transmits any health information in electronic form . . . ."); see 42
U.S.C. § 1320d-(3) (defining a healthcare provider as "a provider of medical or other
health services, ... and any other person furnishing health care services or supplies").
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at
82,464 (stating "[a] right to privacy in personal information has historically found
expression in American law").
See id. at 82, 465-67.
See id. at 82, 466-67.
J. Christopher Smith, Recognizing The Split: The Jurisdictional Treatment Of Defense
Counsel's Ex Parte Contact With Plaintiff's Treating Physician, 23 J. LEGAL PROF.
247,251 (1999) (arguing that if patients are afforded greater privacy protections, then
they can obtain greater medical treatment).
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, SUMMARY OF THE
HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 2 (2003), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacylhipaa/
understandinglsummary/index.htrnl.
REpORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A REPORTER'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL
PRIVACY LAW 3 (2007), available at http://rcfp.orglrcfp/orders/docsIMEDPRIV.pdf.
According to the drafters, the goal of the Privacy Rule-the part of HIPAA that
governs public release of information-can prove so frustrating because it gives
patients more control of the dissemination of their medical information. Id.

38.

Id.

39.

Standards for Privacy ofIndividually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at
82,529.
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disclosed by covered entities to defense attorneys.40 Although the
Privacy Rule's regulations relating to the disclosure of protected
health infonnation ("PHI,,)41 are comprehensive in scheme, and
unambiguously remove the infonnality commonly associated with ex
parte communications, the Rule does not explicitly mention ex parte
interviews. 42 In fact, the now codified version of the Privacy Rule,
found at 45 c.P.R. sections 160 and 164, provides an explicit
exception to disclosure of PHI during judicial proceedings.43
III. WHEN MAY A COVERED ENTITY DISCLOSE PATIENT
INFORMATION?
In most instances, the Privacy Rule prohibits health care providers
from disclosing a patient's PHI without valid authorization. 44
However, despite the Privacy Rule's applicability to both written and
oral communications,45 there are instances in which "[a] covered
entity may use or disclose the [PHI] without the written authorization
of the [patient], as described in [45 C.P.R.] § 164.508,[46] or the
opportunity for the [patient] to agree to or object as described in [45
C.P.R.] section 164.510 .... "47 Notwithstanding the fact that there
are exceptions pennitting disclosure of PHI, the use or disclosure of

40.
41.

42.

43.
44.

45.
46.

47.

See id.; see also infra Part III.B.
PHI information is defined as "individually identifiable health information ... that is:
(i) [t]ransmitted by electronic media; (ii) [m]aintained in electronic media; or (iii)
[t]ransmitted or maintained in any other form or medium .... " 45 C.F.R. § 160.103
(2014).
Croskey v. BMW of N. Am. Inc., No. 02-73747, 2005 WL 4704767, at *4 (E.D.
Mich. Nov. 10, 2005).
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e).
See id. § 164.508 (defining the uses and disclosures for which a valid authorization is
required, and the necessary components of such a authorization); see also id. §
l64.502(b) ("When using or disclosing [PHI] ... a covered entity ... must make
reasonable efforts to limit [PHI] to the minimum necessary to accomplish the intended
purpose of the use, disclosure, or request."). Furthermore, it should be noted that the
minimum necessary requirement is not applicable when "[u]se[] or disclosure[] [is]
made pursuant to an authorization under § 164.508." Id. § 164.502(b)(2)(iii).
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 130, 42 U.S.C. §
1320d-(4) (2012); see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
"Except as otherwise permitted or required . . . a covered entity may not use or
disclose [PHI] without an authorization . . . and such use or disclosure must be
consistent with such authorization." 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(I).
Id. § 164.512. Notwithstanding the fact that "[a] covered entity may use or disclose
[PHI] without ... the opportunity for the individual to agree or object," id. § 164.512,
under the judicial proceedings subsection it is required that an opportunity be made
available "to permit the individual to raise an objection . . .."
Id. §
164.512(e)( I )(iii)(B).
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this private information must still comply with the limitations
enunciated in the Privacy Rule. 48 Of the six possible disclosure
exceptions set forth in the Privacy Rule,49 only one, in conjunction
with its relevant cross-referenced section, permits the use or
disclosure of PHI in ex parte communications. 50
A.

The "Required By Law" Exception and State Law Preemption

While subsections (a)51 and (e) of 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 are both
relevant to ex parte communication, subsection (a) produces a large
portion of the confusion in judicial application. Subsection (a) of 45
C.F.R. § 164.512 establishes an exception whereby a covered entity
may use or disclose PHI without first obtaining written patient
authorization if the "disclosure is required by law."52 According to
the drafters of the Privacy Rule, a disclosure is "required by law" if
"a mandate [exists] that compels a [covered] entity to make a use or
disclosure of [PHI] and that is enforceable in a court of law."53 As
such, a disclosure "required by law" includes, but is not limited to,
Despite this seeming
court orders, subpoenas, and statutes. 54
exception, a health care provider's disclosure of PHI is impermissible
without a threshold inquiry under HIPAA's preemption language. 55
Under its preemption scheme, "[HIPAA] shall supersede any
contrary provision of State law."56 A state law is contrary in the eyes
of HIP AA if "[ a] covered entity . . . would find it impossible to
comply with both the State and Federal requirements;[57] or [t]he
provision of State law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of [HIP AA]. ,,58
Although it may not have been the intent of the drafters to make
things more difficult for the judiciary, HIPAA provides an exception
stating that it will not preempt a State law if the law provides the
48.
49.
50.
51.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

57.
58.

ld. § 164.502(a) (stating that use or disclosure must comply with the Privacy Rule).
ld. § 164.502(a)(l)(i)-(vi).
See id. § 164.502(a)(I)(i)-(v).
ld. § 164.512(a)(I)(v) (referencing when use or disclosure requires the patient to agree
or object); see also id. § 164.510 (discussing when use or disclosure requires the
patient to agree or object).
Jd. § 164.512(a)( 1).
ld. § 164.103.
ld.
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 1320, 42 U.S.c. §
1320d-7(a)(l) (2012).
Id.
45 C.F.R. § 160.202.
ld.
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patients with "more stringent" protections than those available in the
Privacy Rule. 59 As such, one of the most common difficulties
plaguing courts interpreting the Privacy Rule is their inability to
make the threshold determination as to whether State law and Federal
law are contrary.60
This initial threshold analysis is crucial because if two laws are not
contrary, they generally can be reconciled without one law
preempting the other, thereby eliminating the need for a more
problematic stringency analysis. 61 Currently, the Privacy Rule's
definitions of "contrary" significantly narrow the occasions in which
a State law and HIPAA will in fact be contrary.62 The seminal
Maryland case Law v. Zuckerman 63 provides a prime example of a
court properly recognizing that a State law is contrary to HIPAA, but
unnecessarily analyzing the "more stringent" requirement. 64
In Law, the Plaintiff brought a medical malpractice suit against her
physician for injuries allegedly sustained during the removal of
abnormal cells in surgery.65 During the course of discovery, defense
counsel had ex parte communications with Plaintiffs non-party
treating physician. 66 In support of his actions, Defendant's attorney
argued that the Maryland Confidentiality of Medical Records Act67
governed the case, not HIPAA. 68 In rejecting defense counsel's
argument, the court erroneously relied upon the "more stringent"
exception to the Privacy Rule, interpreting "more stringent" to mean
"the [increased] ability of the patient to withhold permission and to
effectively block disclosure [of their PHI]. ,,69 By relying on this
59.

60.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

68.
69.

/d. In order to meet the "more stringent" requirement, the law must "provide[] greater
privacy protection for the individual who is the subject of the individually identifiable
health information." Id.
See Beverly Cohen, Reconciling the HIPAA Privacy Rule with State Laws Regulating
Ex Parte Interviews of Plaintiffs' Treating Physicians: A Guide to Performing HIPAA
Preemption Analysis, 43 Hous. L. REV. 1091, 1129-31 (2006).
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.202-.203.
See id. § 160.202.
Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705 (D. Md. 2004).
45 C.F.R. § 160.202(6); Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 709-11.
Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 707.
Id.
Id. at 709. According to the Maryland Confidentiality of Medical Records Act, "[a]
health care provider shall disclose a medical record without the authorization of a
person in interest ... [t]o . . . legal counsel, all information in a medical record
relating to a patient or recipient's health, health care or treatment which forms the
basis for the issues of a claim .... " MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 4-306(b)(3)
(LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2014).
Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 709.
Id. at 711.
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exception, the Law court failed to apply the "General Rule" that
"[HIPAA] shall supersede any contrary provision of State law.,,70
Rather than stating "[i]f [a] state law can force disclosure ... it is not
'more stringent' than . . . HIP AA,,,71 the court more appropriately
should have found that "[i]f [a] state law can force disclosure" it is
"impossible to comply with both the State and Federal requirements,"
thus triggering HIP AA preemption.72 This case of first impression
not only misapplied the HIP AA preemption analysis, it created
flawed precedent for the Fourth Circuit. 73
Although HHS affirmed during its final public commenting process
that the Privacy Rule was not intended to disrupt existing legal
obligations,74 the aforementioned HIPAA preemption provision does
just that. 75 In fact, the Privacy Rule not only disrupts existing legal
obligations, it also places an undue burden on the jUdiciary. While
HIP AA may preempt any "required" state law "contrary" to it, it does
not necessarily follow that court-permitted ex parte communications
are preempted as well.
1.

HIP AA and the Physician-Patient Privilege

In addition to the difficulty in determining whether or not a state
law is contrary to HIPAA and the Privacy Rule, courts post-HIPAA
have also grappled with the application of the physician-patient
privilege.
Historically, "[f]ederal common law has not . . .
recognized a privilege between patients and physicians.,,76 Therefore,
many states have chosen to codify the privilege. 77 However, it is well
settled that when a plaintiff initiates a lawsuit thereby placing PHI at
issue, that privilege is waived, "thereby subjecting the [private]

70.
71.
72.
73.

74.

75.
76.
77.

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 1320, 42 U.S.C. §
1320d-(7)(a)(1) (2012).
Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 711.
Id.; 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2014).
See Piehl v. Saheta, No. CCB-13-254, 2013 WL 2470128, at *1-2 (D. Md. June 5,
2013) (viewing "a 'more stringent state law' is any law that gives patients increased
control over their own medical records" (citing Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 709)).
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462,82,668 (Dec. 28,2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) ("The [Privacy]
[R]ule's approach is simply intended to avoid any obstruction to the health plan or
covered health care provider's ability to comply with its existing legal obligations.").
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a).
United States v. Bek, 493 F.3d 790, 801 (7th Cir. 2007).
See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4504(a) (McKinney 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-2-101
(2012).
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information to discovery.,,78 Post-HIPAA, courts have addressed the
issue of whether or not the "waiver,,79 principle has remained intact,
and they have struggled to analyze its effect on ex parte
communication.
In Thomas v. Ontario Inc., the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan found that, unlike Michigan law, which
permits ex parte communications following plaintiffs waiver of the
physician-patient privilege, HIP AA does not allow for an automatic
waiver of the privilege. 80 However, the Thomas court did not base its
finding on a HIPAA created physician-patient privilege;81 rather, the
court emphasized the goal of HIP AA in ensuring the security and
privacy of health information. 82 Additionally, the Thomas court
found that HIP AA and the Privacy Rule implemented several
regulatory exceptions specifically tailored to the disclosure of
information during litigation proceedings. 83 While it can be argued
that this interpretation of HIP AA and the federal physician-patient
privilege is most accurate, one certainty remains: this decision
represents a vastly differing view when compared to neighboring
jurisdictions.
In the case of National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft,84 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
quashed a government subpoena for medical records citing HIPAA's
recognition of the "importance of the privacy of medical records.,,85
In the opinion, Judge Charles Kocoras found that HIP AA, in
conjunction with Federal Rule of Evidence 501, compelled the
recognition of a federal physician-patient privilege. 86 Furthermore, in
rejecting the plaintiffs argument that no physician-patient privilege
existed under common law, the Ashcroft court found that HIPAA and
its privacy regulations governed privilege, not Federal Rule of
78.

79.
80.
81.

82.
83.

84.
85.
86.

Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 182 F. Supp. 2d 370,381 (D. Del. 2002); Daniel
M. Roche, Don't Ask, Don't Tell, HIPAA 'S EJfect on Informal Discovery in Products
Liability and Personal Injury Cases, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1075, 1094 (2006).
See Holamn v. Rasak, 761 N.W.2d 391, 391-92 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008), aJf'd, 764
N.W.2d 583 (Mich. 2009).
Thomas v. 1156729 Ontario Inc., 979 F. Supp. 2d 780,783 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
Id. at 782.
Id.
Id. at 783; see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2014) (outlining federal statutory
provisions allowing disclosure of health care information).
Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, No. 04-C-55, 2004 WL 292079, at *2 (N.D. 111.
Feb. 6, 2004), ajJ'd, 362 F.3d 923 (7th CiT. 2004).
Id. at *2, *6-7 (quoting United States v. Sutherland, 143 F. Supp. 2d 609,612 (W.D.
Va. 2001».
Id. at *4-6.
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Evidence 501, because they were produced by an "[a]ct of
Congress.,,87 Within a matter of months, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion directly
contradicting Ashcroft. 88
In writing for a split Seventh Circuit, Judge Richard Posner found
that all HIP AA and its privacy regulations "should be understood to
do ... is to create a procedure for obtaining authority to use medical
records in litigation ... [and][w]e do not think HIPAA is rightly
understood as an Act of Congress that creates a privilege.,,89 These
two cases not only plainly show the varying interpretation within the
same circuit-albeit the district court and the appellate court-but
they also illustrate the growing possibility of forum shopping with
respect to HIP AA interpretation.
For example, in Holzle v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., Inc., the New
York Supreme Court addressed the growing inconsistency among
courts within the jurisdiction with respect to the physician-patient
privilege and HIPAA. 90 In its analysis, the Holzle court disregarded
the holdings of other justices "seem[ing] to infer that the Privacy
Rule provides substantive rights for plaintiffs .... ,,91 Despite its
dismissal of previous interpretations and applications of HIP AA and
the Privacy Rule to ex parte communication and the physician-patient
privilege, the Holzle court nevertheless reviewed the case, assuming
arguendo, that the Privacy Rule did create some form of rights for the
plaintiff in litigation. 92 Even under this interpretation, the court found
that by bringing a personal injury action wherein the plaintiff
affirmatively places their mental or physical condition at issue, "that
party waives any rights or remedies under HIP AA as to the . . .
conditions asserted in the litigation.,,93
In support of its disposition, the Holzle court provided a more wellreasoned argument than "HIPAA rights [act] as a sword against
defendants but as a shield for plaintiffs [that] would have [an] unfair
result.,,94 The court reasoned that the waiver of HIPAA rights is as
implicit as the waiver of the physician-patient privilege in
87.
88.
89.
90.

91.
92.

93.
94.

Jd. at *5.
Nw. Mem'l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004).
Jd. at 925-26.
Holzle v. Health Servs. Grp., No. 110376, 2005 WL 1252597, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 24, 2005).
Jd. at *6.
Jd.
Jd. (emphasis added).
Jd. at *6.
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jurisdictions recognizing such a privilege. 95 More significantly, the
court found that the implicit HIP AA waiver approach is "consistent
with the principles of separation of powers and statutory
construction.,,96 Furthennore, the court found that by not forcing
unwanted authorizations on plaintiffs, the concern about creating
legislation or regulatory schemes without the guidance of the
Legislature dissipated. 97
Conversely, if the plaintiff in Holzle had filed their complaint in a
different New York venue, assuming arguendo, that the procedural
requirements were met, a considerably different result would have
ensued. 98 In the case of Keshecki v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr.,99 the
New York Supreme Court for Richmond County, recognized that the
physician-patient confidentiality privilege had been codified in New
York state law for over 175 years. lOO Furthennore, the court also
found that plaintiffs generally waive certain privacy rights when they
claim an injury because defendants are entitled to discover the nature
of their injuries. 101 However, the court ultimately held that the
Privacy Rule preempted New York law regarding ex parte
communications because the New York law offered less stringent
privacy protections. 102 Therefore, the court ruled that "HIPAA
protects the privacy of the plaintiff ... [and] [t]he only adequate
remedy to protect that right is to preclude any evidence obtained
contrary to [HIPAA] safeguards.,,103
While all of the aforementioned cases still remain "good law," only
one interpretation confonns to the legislative intent, the plain
meaning. Under the plain meaning canon of ,statutory construction,
courts adhere to the principle that if the words of a statute are clear
and unambiguous, the court need not inquire any further into the
meaning of the statute. 104 With respect to HIP AA and the Privacy
Rule, courts need only look to the language of the statute when
determining whether a state law is preempted by HIP AA. "The
preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires [the judiciary]
95.
96.
97.
98.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Keshecki v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., 785 N.Y.S.2d 300, 305 (NY. Sup. Ct.
2004) (rejecting the implied waiver theory and holding that HIPPA requires
authorization from the patient before private physician interviews are conducted).
Id.
Id. at 302.
Id.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 305.
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2003).
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to 'presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there. ",105 HIP AA and the Privacy
Rule provide the judiciary with a step-by-step guide in determining
whether a state law is more stringent than HIP AA or whether state
law is contrary, which minimizes the risks of nonconformity that may
result from judicial discretion. Additionally, during the public
commenting process, the drafters explicitly stated that they did "not
intend for the privacy regulation to interfere with . . . state rules of
evidence that create privileges. ,,\06 Were it Congress' and HHS'
intention to create such a privilege, it is likely that more direct and
specific language would have been used, similarly to other statutorily
created privileges. l07
There are several noteworthy arguments as to why a federal
physician-patient privilege is needed now, including the fact that
physicians possess a greater wealth of patient health information than
ever before, \08 advances in technology pose new potential threats to
patient privacy,109 and there is an increasing number of individuals
with access to patients' medical information. llo While all of these
concerns are valid, they fail to account for the fact that when HIP AA
and the Privacy Rule were being promulgated, the drafters were
readily cognizant of these potential dangers, so much so that they
extended the privacy requirements well beyond the required
minimum. III In essence, the proponents of a federally enacted
physician-patient privilege are implying that the privacy protections
provided by HIP AA are insufficient and fail to achieve their intended
end.

105. BedRoc, Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (citing Conn. Nat'l
Bank v. Gennain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)).
106. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Infonnation, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462,82,597 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
107. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 409 (2006) (stating that certain reports "shall not be subject to
discovery or admitted into evidence in a Federal or State court proceeding").
108. Ralph Ruebner & Leslie Ann Reis, Hippocrates to HIPAA: A Foundation For A
Federal Physician-Patient Privilege, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 505, 520 (2004).
109. Id. at 521.
11 O. Id. at 524.
111. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, Sec. 264(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d). Under the pre-codified version of
HlPAA, HHS was required to address only "the rights that [a patient] who is [the]
subject of individually identifiable health infonnation should haver,] the procedures
that should be established for the exercise of such rights[, and] [t]he use[] and
disclosures of such infonnation that should be authorized or required." !d.
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However, this argument is flawed in that it fails to recognize that
HIP AA and the Privacy Rule act as a federally created floor which
only permits the disclosure of PHI during judicial proceedings if
certain procedural requirements are met. 112 Therefore, if the judiciary
appropriately applies the preemption scheme, as explicitly stated in
the plain language of HIPAA and the Privacy Rule, the need for a
federal physician-patient privilege ceases to exist. Accordingly, in a
jurisdiction where an individual waives the statutorily created
physician-patient privilege by filing a lawsuit, a judge reading the
plain language of HIP AA and the Privacy Rule will see that the state
law is "contrary" II 3 to, not "more stringent,,114 than HIPAA, thus
triggering the federally created privacy protections. I IS

B.

The "Judicial Proceedings" Exception to PHI Disclosure

By the time of full compliance in April 2003,116 more than a dozen
states and the District of Columbia expressly permitted ex parte
interviews with plaintiffs' non-party treating physicians. 117 Despite
the effect that HIP AA and the Privacy Rule had on the dissemination
of PHI, nowhere among HIPAA's express provisions, or even
HIP AA' s legislative history, is any reference made to ex parte
communication. 118
However, under the judicial proceedings
exception, drafted by HHS and enacted by Congress, ex parte
communication with health care providers is implicitly allowed. 119
112. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2014); see also discussion infra Part I1LB (describing the
requirements necessary for disclosure of PHI during judicial proceedings).
113. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202.
114. Id. By analyzing the plain meaning of a State law, a judge should be able to tell
whether the law provides greater privacy protections with respect to individuals'
identifiable health infonnation, or greater rights to individuals with respect to that
infonnation.
115. See 42 U.S.c. § 1320d-(7)(a)(l) (2012); see also Holamn v. Rasak, 761 N.W.2d 391,
393 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008), rev'd, 485 NW.2d 98 (Mich. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 913 (2011) ("Under HIPAA . . . the filing of a lawsuit does not waive the
confidentiality of health information . . . . "); 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (providing the
definition of both "contrary" and "more stringent").
116. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
117. Aripoli, supra note 4, at 506.
118. Bruce R. Parker & D.S. Gray, The Impact of HIPAA on Ex Parte Interviews with
Plaintiffs' Treating Physicians: Preemption or Red Herring?, DRUG, DEVICE &
BIOTECH COMM. NEWSL. (Int'I Assoc. of Def. Counsel, Chicago, III.), Dec. 2003, at 34, reprinted in HIPPA [sic] and Interviews: Pre-emption or Red Herring?, 71 DEF.
COUNS. J. 208, 211 (2004).
119. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (stating that "[a] covered entity may disclose protected health
infonnation [without authorization] in the course of any judicial or administrative
proceeding").
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Pursuant to the Privacy Rule's regulations, a health care provider
may release PHI without the patient's authorization pursuant to a
court order "provided that the covered entity discloses only the [PHI]
expressly authorized by such order.,,12o Alternatively, PHI may be
released pursuant to "a subpoena, discovery request, or other lawful
process."l2l Unlike the first provision, the second provision contains
a notable caveat: where no formal court order exists, the covered
entity must receive from the defendant requesting PHI either
"satisfactory assurance[ s]" or a "qualified protective order" before
disclosing the PHI. 122 The satisfactory assurances requirement
represents a clear divergence from pre-HIPAA ex parte
communications in that this provision places the opposing party on
notice. 123 The covered entity receives satisfactory assurances when
the defendants' attorney demonstrates his or her good faith effort to
provide written notice to the plaintiff. 124 Additionally, the notice
must include "sufficient information about the litigation" so that the
patient may object to the disclosure.1 25 Finally, the assurance must
show that the time for objection to the disclosure has lapsed and that
the patient did not file any objections, or that the court resolved all
pending objections. 126
With respect to satisfactory assurances regarding qualified
protective orders, the requesting attorney must demonstrate in writing
that "the parties . . . agreed to a qualified protective order and . . .
presented it to the COurt,,,127 or "[t]he party seeking the protected
health information has requested a qualified protective order. ,,128 The
Privacy Rule has established a two prong restriction for a qualified
protective order in that it prohibits the parties from using or
disclosing the PHI beyond the scope of the pending litigation, and
requires the return or destruction of the health information, including
copies, at the end of the litigation. 129
While none of these provisions expressly prohibit or allow ex parte
communication some may argue that the judicial exception has a

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

!d. § 164.512(e)(l)(i).
!d. § 164.512(e)(l)(ii).
Id.
See id.
See id. § 164.512(e)(l)(ii)-(iii)(A).
Id. § 164.512(e)(l)(iii)(B).
Id. § 164.512(e)(l)(iii)(C)(l)-(2).
Id. § 164.512(e)(l)(iv)(A).
Id. § 164.512(e)(l)(iv)(B) (emphasis added).
Id. § 164.512(e)(l)(v)(A) -(B).
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practical effect of ending the practice. 130 However, there is a
significant difference between interpreting HIP AA as an outright
prohibition of ex parte communication,131 and interpreting the statute
to make the practice more formaL 132 The purpose of this Comment is
not to argue that the pre-HIPAA informal discovery practices are
alive and well, but rather to address the glaring inconsistencies
arising primarily out of the judicial proceedings exception, and
suggest how a federal statute intended to increase privacy rights is
misapplied in many jurisdictions.
IV. HIPAA'S IMPACT ON EX PARTE COMMUNICATION
WITH PHYSICIANS
Ex parte communication with non-party treating physicians is a
long-established method of discovery that provides benefits to both
plaintiffs and defendants. 133 First, and most importantly, ex parte
communication removes barriers that prevent parties from obtaining
the candid truth.134 By allowing ex parte communication, courts open
a line of communication that is more conducive to spontaneity and
less intimidating than depositions.
Secondly, ex parte
communication by definition permits only the interviewing party to
be present. 135 Therefore, by requiring one party to forgo their
presence, this invariably saves valuable time, allowing for better trial
preparation. 136 In addition to saving time for both parties in
preparation and attendance of depositions, ex parte communications
provide a societal benefit; by saving non-party physicians from
130. "Ex parte communications between defense counsel and a plaintiffs treating
physician for the purpose of gaining a strategic advantage in the defense of a civil
lawsuit therefore violate both the letter and the spirit of [HIPAA]." David G. Wirtes,
Jr. et aI., An Important Consequence of HIPAA: No More Ex Parte Communications
Between Defense Attorneys and Plaintiffs' Treating Physicians, 27 AM. J. TRIAL
AovOC. I, 9 (2003).
131. See Crenshaw v. MONY Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1029 (S.D. Cal. 2004)
("HIPAA does not authorize ex parte contacts with healthcare providers.").
132. See Bayne v. Provost, 359 F. Supp. 2d 234, 243 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (ordering that the
qualified protective order state in bold letters that the infonnation sought is to assist
the defendant in defense of a lawsuit brought by plaintiff).
133. Angela T. Burnette & D'Andrea J. Morning, HIPAA and Ex Parte Interviews-The
Beginning of the End?, 1 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 73, 76-77 (2008). "[E]x parte
interviews are quicker and more efficient than fonnal discovery in that they reduce the
time needed to prepare for trial." John Jennings, The Physician-Patient Relationship:

The Permissibility of Ex Parte Communications Between Plaintiff's Treating
Physicians and Defense Counsel, 50 Mo. L. REv. 441,458 (1994).
134. J. Christopher Smith, supra note 35, at 252.
135. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 316 (9th ed. 2009).
136. See Burnette & Morning, supra note 133, at 77.
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attending time-consuming depositions, they are better able to perform
their medical obligations. 137 One judge post-HIPAA has gone as far
as to say that requiring a deposition in lieu of ex parte communication
"significantly interfer[es] with the practice of medicine.,,138 Finally,
ex parte communication is efficient and cost effective in that it allows
parties to evaluate potential witnesses without unnecessary spending
on discovery. 139
Despite these benefits, prior to HIP AA and the promulgation of the
Privacy Rule, numerous policy arguments existed disfavoring ex
parte communication. An argument frequently relied upon by
plaintiffs in opposition to ex parte communications "is the [risk] of a
physician revealing confidential information unrelated to the
lawsuit.,,140 This was a legitimate concern pre-HIPAA, however,
currently it is without merit. Through the promulgation of the
Privacy Rule, Congress imposed limitations regarding what
information a physician may disclose during ex parte interviews. 141
Under the Privacy Rule's judicial proceedings exception, "only ...
[PHI] expressly authorized [by the court]" may be disclosed during
these ex parte communications. 142
The most predominant argument disfavoring the communications is
that "ex parte [interviews] yield no greater evidence ... than that
which is already obtainable through the regular methods of
discovery.,,143 Although more formal methods of discovery are
available, this argument fails to recognize that these litigious
alternatives subj ect physicians to unnecessary cross-examination, 144
and are more costly than practices such as ex parte interviews. 145
While the policy behind ex parte interviews has been highly
contested, prior to the promulgation of HIPAA and the Privacy Rule
these communications "created little controversy.,,146 Since HIPAA's
promulgation, the arguments from the plaintiffs and defense counsel
have shifted dramatically. Public policy is no longer the crux of the
argument; now the plaintiff bar and defense bar are in dispute as to
137. Id.
138. Kish v. Graham, 88 N.Y.S.2d 313, 320 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (Pine, 1., dissenting).
139. Burnette & Morning, supra note 133, at 77.
140. Bobby Russ, Can We Talk? The Rest Of The Story Or Why Defense Attorneys Should
Not Talk to the Plaintiff's Doctors, 39 TENN. B.l., Feb. 2003, at 29.
141. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(I)(i) (2014).

142. Id.
143. Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
144. See Burnette & Morning, supra note 133, at 77.

145. Id.
146. Ottinger v. Mausner, No. 1527/04, slip op. at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 20, 2006).
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whether HIP AA' s Privacy Rule establishes an outright prohibition
against ex parte interviews. 147 The arguments presented by both
plaintiffs and defense counsels have resulted in three vastly different
categories of court interpretations.
The first of these categories can be classified as judicial
interpretations, which holds that ex parte interviews with a plaintiffs
non-party physician violate HIP AA' s Privacy Rule. 148 The second
category of judicial interpretation can be classified as holding ex
parte communication may occur, but only if the procedural
requirements of the Privacy Rule are met. 149 The final category of
interpretations is characterized as dispositions finding that HIP AA
does not apply to ex parte discovery, or alternatively, questioning its
applicability. 150 These varying interpretations of the same statute,
some even within the same jurisdiction,151 exemplify the need for
immediate clarification of HIP AA and the Privacy Rule.
A.

HIPAA Prohibits Ex Parte Communication With Physicians

When looking to the source of these inconsistent dispositions, one
need only look to 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.512(e)152 and 160.202.153 As
previously discussed in Part lILA., when a State law is "[ c]ontrary,,154
to HIP AA in order for the law to not be preempted, it must be
"[m]ore stringent,,155 than the requirements of the Privacy Rule. In
many cases, courts are struggling both to distinguish between
contrary and more stringent; specifically, these cases are focusing on
whether the law "provides greater privacy protection for the [patient]
who is the subject of the [PHI].,,156

147. See Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705 (D. Md. 2004); see also Crenshaw v.
MONY Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1027-1030 (S.D. Cal. 2004).
148. See EEOC v. Bos. Mkt. Corp., No. CV 03-4227, 2004 WL 3327264, at *1-5
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,2004).
149. See Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 708; see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2014) (elaborating
on the procedures for disclosure).
150. See Holzle v. Health Servs. Grp., 801 N.Y.S.2d 234 (May 24, 2005).
15l. Compare Bayne v. Provost, 359 F. Supp. 2d 234, 243 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that a
HIPAA-compliant qualified protective order allowed ex parte communication), with
Holzle, 801 N.Y.S.2d 234, at *6 (May 24, 2005) (finding that plaintiff waived HIPAA
rights when she placed her medical condition at issue).
152. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e).
153. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.202.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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In the case of Law v. Zuckerman,157 the Fourth Circuit addressed
HIP AA and ex parte communication as a matter of first impression. 158
Although the mandated provision of the Maryland Confidentiality of
Medical Records Act was contrary to HIP AA in that a covered entity
could not comply with both State and Federal law, the court
interpreted "greater privacy protection,,159 erroneously. 160
This
interpretation established precedent not only contrary to the drafter's
intentions, but to the judicial disclosure exception as well. In the
comments to the Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable
Health Information, HHS stated:
The provisions in [section 164.S12(e)] are not intended to
disrupt current practice whereby an individual who is a
party to a proceeding and has put his or her medical
condition at issue will not prevail without consenting to the
production of his or her protected health information. In
such cases, we presume that parties will have ample notice
and an opportunity to object in the context of the proceeding
in which the individual is a party. 161
Although the court in Law ultimately recognized that ex parte
communications were permitted so long as HIP AA's disclosure
requirements were satisfied,162 this overly stringent interpretation set
the tone for the Fourth Circuit, and established persuasive authority
for neighboring state courts. 163
The Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed the issue of HIP AA and
ex parte communication in the case of Alsip v. Johnson City Med.
Ctr.l64 In Alsip, defense counsel sought an order allowing their'
attorneys to conduct ex parte interviews with the decedent's nonparty treating physician. 165 The trial court granted the order;
however, the appellate court found that the order was an abuse of
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

162.
163.
164.
165.

Law v. Zuckennan, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705 (D. Md. 2004).
Id. at 706-07.
45 C.F.R. § 160.202.
See supra Part III.A.
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Infonnation, 65 Fed. Reg.
82, 462, 82, 530 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (emphasis
added).
Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 708.
See Alsip v. Johnson City Med. Ctr., No. E2004-00831-COA-R9-CV, 2005 WL
1536192, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27,2005), aff'd, 197 S.W.3d 722 (Tenn. 2006).
!d. at *9-10.
Id. at *2.
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judicial discretion because HIP AA did not permit ex parte
communication. 166 Rather than performing the HIP AA balancing test
to determine whether state law is contrary, the appellate court relied
almost entirely on Givens v. Mullikin 167 and the waiver of physicianIn dicta, the coUI1 reaffirmed Law v.
patient privilege. 168
Zuckerman's definition of "more stringent,,,169 ultimately concluding
that pre-HIPAA, "[ex parte] discussions were once the order of the
day, [but] that day has, for better or for worse, come to an end.,,170
Although the Alsip decision remains at the far end of the ex parte
communication spectrum, the disposition shows a complete disregard
for the procedural requirements established in HIPAA's Privacy
Rule. 171 Within a matter of years, the United States District Court for
the Western District of Tennessee reevaluated ex parte
communication, in compliance with the Privacy Rule's procedural
requirements, and reached a vastly different conclusion.172 In a case
of first impression within this district, the Wade v. Vabnick-Wener
court found that "[a]fter the requisite protective order is entered ...
defendant is free to utilize informal discovery, including ex parte
interviews, under HIP AA." 173 These contradicting decisions within
the same state offer support for the notion that if the judiciary cannot,
sua sponte, systemically walk through the HIPAA analysis, then a
legislatively enacted instrument must be in place to help guide
them. 174
In response to the inconsistent dispositions within its own state, the
Tennessee legislature amended the Medical Malpractice statute with
what has fittingly been referred to as the "Givens Fix.,,175 Under the

166. Id. at *9-10.
167. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7 (2012); Alsip, 2005 WL 1536192, at *10; see also Givens v.
Mullikin, 75 S.W.3d 383 (Tenn. 2002).
168. See Givens, 75 S.W.3d at 405.
169. Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705,711 (D. Md. 2004).
170. Alsip, 2005 WL 1536192, at *9-10.
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7 (2012); see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2014).
172. See Wade v. Vabnick-Wener, 922 F. Supp. 2d 679 (W.D. Tenn. 2010).
173. Id. at 685-86,691.
174. See generally Nancy Efle & Anne Talcott, Procedural Hurdles: HIPAA and Ex Parte
Contact With the Treating Physician, FOR THE DEF., May 2006, at 60, 61-65
(discussing the varied and at times contradicting results courts have reached regarding
HlPPA 's Privacy Rule); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-121(f) (2012 & Supp.
2014) (providing an example of legislation that provides guidance for HIPPA
compliance within a "health care liability action").
175. Jennifer Pearson Taylor & Angela L. Morris, Legal Matters: The - Givens Fix Ex
Parte Communication between Non-Party Physicians and Defense Attorneys, E.
TENN. MED. NEWS, (Aug. 07, 2012), http://www.easttnmedicalnews.comlcontentJ
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"Givens Fix" defendants may petition the court upon the filing of a
medical malpractice suit, "for a qualified protective order allowing
the defendant or defendant and their attorneys the right to obtain
[PHI] during interviews, outside the presence of claimant or
claimant's counsel .... "176 In essence, the Tennessee legislature
adopted part of the Privacy Rule's judicial proceedings exception,
incorporating it into the state code. While this legislative action
appears to solve the issue of whether ex parte communications are
allowed, there are several negative implications of which other states
should be aware before following in Tennessee's footsteps.
First and foremost, by incorporating part of the Privacy Rule into
the state code, Tennessee has not eliminated the future need to
address HIPAA's applicability. The "Givens Fix," while almost
verbatim conforming to the judicial proceedings exception, still fails
to address what must be done with the PHI following the completion
of the lawsuit. 177 This minor omission will likely have complicating
results. If a clever plaintiff were to argue that HIP AA provides more
stringent privacy protections than the "Givens Fix," which it
essentially does,178 then courts will be right back where they started,
almost as if the "Givens Fix" never existed. Additionally, Tennessee
courts and other states choosing to incorporate part of the Privacy
Rule, could engage in definitional manipulation to completely bar ex
parte communication. Neither HIPAA nor the Privacy Rule define
"in the course Of,179 or a "judicial or administrative proceeding,,,180 or
expressly state whether the term should be given its common, narrow,
or broad definition. 181 Therefore, if state legislatures wish to avoid
future judicial nonconformity, not only should they codify aspects of
the Privacy Rule, they also should define the aforementioned phrases.
While some jurisdictions, such as Tennessee, have taken steps to
address inconsistent dispositions, many have remained firm in their
opinion that HIP AA prohibits ex parte communication. In the case of
Crenshaw v. MONY Life Ins. Co., the United States District Court for
the Southern District of California issued a highly inconsistent

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

legal-matters-givens-fix%C2%9D-ex-parte-communication-between-non-partyphysicians-and-defense.
§ 29-26-121(f)(1).
See id.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2014).
Id.
Id.
State ex reI. Proctor v. Messina, 320 S.W.3d 145, 156 (Mo. 2010).
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opinion regarding HIP AA and ex parte communication. 182 In
Crenshaw, the Plaintiff sought to disqualify an expert physician with
whom the Defendant's counsel had communicated ex parte. 183
Because California law did not prohibit all ex parte contact, the court
found that such practices were in conflict with the letter and spirit of
HIP AA. 184 After determining that the communication did not fall
within HIPAA's disclosure requirements, the court stated "HIPAA
does not authorize ex parte contacts with healthcare providers.,,185 To
further add to the already glaring inconsistencies in its own opinion,
the court found that PHI can be disclosed if the requirements of 45
C.F.R. § 164.512(e) are satisfied. 186 Crenshaw, like Law, represents
the judiciary'S growing tendency to liberally construe the Privacy
Rule to fit each individual case before it, exemplifying the growing
lack of uniformity with respect to HIPAA application.
The aforementioned cases represent the most conservative
interpretation of HIPAA's stance on ex parte communications.
Although HIP AA undoubtedly formalized the ex parte process, it was
not the intention of the drafters to eliminate the practice entirely.187
In fact, Congress sought to better regulate the practice. 188 These
courts' liberal construction of the unambiguous language of HIP AA' s
Privacy Rule has subsequently established bad precedent for future
personal injury cases.
B.

HIPAA Permits Ex Parte Communications On A Limited Basis

In regards to jurisdictions taking the middle ground approach,
several have held that ex parte interviews can be conducted only if
certain requirements are met. In the case of Smith v. Rafalin, the
Supreme Court of New York directed the Plaintiff to sign HIP AAcompliant authorizations permitting defense counsel to speak
privately with Plaintiffs treating physicians. 189 In support of its
directive, the court recognized equal access to potential evidence,
stating "no party is entitled to restrict an opponent's access to a
witness, however partial or important to him .... "190 Although the
See Crenshaw v. MONY Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015 (S.D. Cal. 2004).
ld. at 1021.
ld. at 1028.
ld. at 1029.
ld. at 1028-29.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7 (2012); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2014).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7 (2012); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (detailing the
regulations for disclosure in proceedings).
189. Smith v. Rafalin, 800 N.Y.S.2d 357 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 24, 2005).
190. ld.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
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disposition in Smith was initially declined to follow by the court in
Arons v. Jutkowitz,191 the Court of Appeals of New York reversed,
holding that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action could be
compelled to execute HIPAA-compliant authorizations for ex parte
communication. 192 Once again, the court found that "[a] party should
not be pennitted to affinnatively assert a medical condition in
seeking damages ... while simultaneously relying on [privacy] as a
sword to thwart the opposition in its efforts to uncover facts critical to
disputing the party's claim."193
With respect to jurisdictions interpreting and applying HIP AA and
the Privacy Rule, New York has established some of the most
inconsistent case law regarding ex parte communication. 194 Within a
year of the EEOC opinion,195 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York issued an opinion addressing the
validity of ex parte interviews. 196 In recognizing that "[a]bsent within
the four comers" of HIP AA is "any mention of . . . ex parte
interview[s]," the court in Bayne v. Provost granted the defendant's
request for a qualified protective order to conduct ex parte
interviews. 197 However, finding that HIPAA preempted New York
law in respect to "more stringent" privacy protections, the Bayne
court took it upon itself to add to the privacy protections in
HIPAA. 198
In granting the qualified protective order, the Bayne court ordered
that the defendant include in the protective order "that the purpose of
the infonnation is to assist the Defendants in defense of a lawsuit
brought by the Plaintiff," and advise the covered entity that this court
order "does not compel her to participate."199 This case represents
just one of many judicial interpretations in which the court recognizes
that HIP AA preempts state patient privacy laws. However, in its
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

196.
197.
198.
199.

See Arons v. Jutkowitz, 825 N.Y.S.2d 738, 742-43 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006), rev'd, 880
N.E.2d 831, 838 (N.Y. 2007).
Arons, 880 N.E.2d at 837-38.
Id. (quoting Dillenbeck v. Hess, 536 N.E.2d 1126, 1132 (N.Y. 1989)).
See id.; see also Bayne v. Provost, 359 F. Supp. 2d 234 (N.D.N.Y. 2005); EEOC v.
Bos. Mkt. Corp., No. CV 03-4227,2004 WL 3327264 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,2004).
Bas. Mkt. Corp., 2004 WL 3327264 (holding that "ex parte communications regarding
the disclosure of health information, while not expressly prohibited by HIP AA, create
... too great a risk of running afoul of that statute's strong federal policy in favor of
protecting the privacy of patient medical records.").
Bayne, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 234.
Id. at 240, 243.
Id. at 241-42; 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2014) (defining "more stringent").
Bayne, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 243.
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application of the Privacy Rule, the court overstretched the express
definition of qualified protective order found therein. 20o The Privacy
Rule unambiguously defines a qualified protective order as an order
of the court "[prohibiting] the parties from using or disclosing the
[PHI] for any purpose other than the litigation . . . and requires the
return . . . or destruction of the [PHI] at the end of the litigation. ,,201
Therefore, by acknowledging that HIPAA preempts New York state
disclosure laws, the court bound itself to the application of HIP AA' s
regulations.
C.

Dispositions Questioning HIPAA 's Validity and Applicability

The final category of dispositions truly emphasizes the lack of
uniformity and uncertainty as to the effect of HIP AA on ex parte
communications. In the case of Smith v. American Home Products
Corp. Wyeth-Ayerst Pharmaceutical, plaintiffs filed a products
liability suit against the defendant for producing an allegedly harmful
pharmaceutical drug. 202 In undertaking a complete HIPAA analysis,
the Smith court recognized that HIP AA was more stringent than New
Jersey law in certain respects, and conversely New Jersey law was
more stringent in other respects. 203 After weighing the true policy
behind HIPAA, the court found that this policy goal is not diminished
through the use of ex parte communication. 204 Similar to other
dispositions, the Smith court relied on the fact that "informal
discovery is not expressly addressed under HIP AA,,,205 therefore,
"courts should be governed by state law.,,206 In the Smith court's
view, New Jersey had "established confidentiality protections" that
provided adequate privacy to patient's PHI, as required by HIP AA.207
Specifically, the court referred to the New Jersey Supreme Court case
of Stempler v. Speidel!, which established three privacy requirements
when defense counsel conducted ex parte interviews. 208 Although the
200. Id. at 241; 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(v)(A)-(B).
201. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(v)(A)-(B).
202. Smith v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. Wyeth-Ayerst Pharm., 855 A.2d 608, 609 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003).
203. Id. at 622-23 (stating that "[o]ne area where state law is more stringent than HIPAA is
related to mental health care practice").
204. Id. at 623.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 619.
208. Id. at 612 (citing Stempler v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857,864 (N.J. 1985)). When defense
counsel conducts ex parte interviews, counsel must: (I) provide plaintiffs counsel
with reasonable notice as to the time and place of the interview, (2) provide the
physician with a description of the anticipated scope of the conversation, and (3)
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Smith court recognized these privacy requirements, the court also
acknowledged that just as in HIP AA, New Jersey statutory law
"carries an exception for civil litigation. "Z09 While the Smith court
reasoned that changes in "discovery techniques [are] not a role for
this court," in deciding whether "HIPAA preempt[ ed] informal
discovery techniques," the court concluded resoundingly that the
"[t]he answer is plainly 'no."'ZIO Notwithstanding this rationale, the
Smith court ultimately rejected the defendant's request for ex parte
communication on the grounds of judicial economy, not privacy
constraints. Z\1
In addition to reserving ex parte grants to state courts, courts have
questioned whether or not ex parte communication even falls under
the "judicial proceedings" exception to 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e).212 In
the case of State ex rei. Proctor v. Messina, the Supreme Court of
Missouri sitting en banc provided a thorough analysis of HIPAA's
"judicial proceedings" exception.213 Of the greatest concern for the
Proctor court was the term's varying definition depending of the
context of its use. Z14 After significant discussion of the multiple
contexts in which a "judicial proceeding" can occur, the Proctor
court ultimately found that "45 C.F.R. 164.512(e), which permits
disclosures in the course of judicial proceedings, does not apply to a
meeting for ex parte communications, and consequently, a trial court
has no authority to issue a purported HIPAA order .... "215
The aforementioned cases more than adequately illustrate the
confusion HIP AA and the Privacy Rule generate. While HIP AA was
promulgated as a device to protect medical information in the face of
numerous electronic advancements, increased privacy regulations

209.
210.
211.

212.

213.
214.
215.

clearly communicate that the physician's participation is voluntary. Stempler, 495
A.2d at 864.
See Smith, 855 A.2d at 620 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.4 (2014»; see also
45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2014).
Smith, 855 A.2d at 621.
See id. at 625-26.
Due to the fact that there were "approximately 300
[phenylpropanolamine tort cases] on [the] court's docket and only one and a half
months until trial," the court found that it would be "improvident to cease discovery to
hold extensive hearings as to what constitutes 'pertinent' medical information and/or
cite all 'more stringent' statutory privacy constraints may apply to ex parte
interviews." Id. at 625.
See, e.g., State ex rei. Proctor v. Messina, 320 S.W.3d 145, 155-56 (Mo. 2010) (en
banc); see also 45 C.F.R. § l64.512(e) (2014) (explaining what a covered entity must
disclose throughout proceedings).
Proctor, 320 S.W.3d at 155-56.
Id.
Id. at 157 (emphasis added).
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were also an established end. However, the bewildering impact on
state discovery practices has been an unintended collateral result.
Through the persistence of plaintiffs' attorneys in conjunction with
inconsistent judicial interpretations, HIP AA has unnecessarily
become a federal symbol of instability and irresolution.
V. A HIPAA INTERPRETATION EVERYONE CAN AGREE
UPON?
In the years since the promulgation of the Privacy Rule, few courts,
if any, have effectively balanced the plaintiffs' privacy concerns with
respect to their PHI and defendants' desire for cost effective
discovery.216 Although ex parte communications do present a risk
that physicians may inadvertently disclose information not related to
the lawsuit,217 they also provide a discovery mechanism which is less
litigious and intimidating to physicians. 218 The New Jersey Superior
Court, in Smith v. American Home Products Corp. Wyeth-Ayerst
Pharmaceutical, issued a well-reasoned opinion wherein it
successfully balanced the plaintiffs competing interest for privacy
with the defendant's desire for cost effective discovery.219 The Smith
court was able to achieve such a noteworthy conclusion through its
determination that "informal discovery is not expressly addressed
under HIPAA," thus permitting defense attorneys to conduct ex parte
interviews within the privacy requirements afforded by state law. 220
While this is a valid proposal for states that already have established
privacy protections, it begs the question: what should states do that
do not have these preexisting requirements?
While it is not implausible for state legislatures to amend current
statutory law, similar to the action taken by the Tennessee State
Legislature/21 this may not be the most prudent approach. The more
practical option is for courts to create these protections through case
law similar to the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Stempier v.
Speidell. 222 In fact, in several jurisdictions where HIPAA and the
Privacy Rule are at issue, courts have established these protections
without even realizing it. For example, in the case of Bayne v.
Provost, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
216. See Smith y. Am. Home Prods. Corp. Wyeth-Ayerst Pharm, 855 A.2d 608, 617-18
217.

218.
219.
220.
221.

(N.J. Super Ct. Law Diy. 2003).
Russ, supra note 140, at 29.

Id.
See Smith, A.2d at 619-27.
See id. at 623.
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-121(f)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2014).
222. Stempler Y. SpeideU, 495 A.2d 857, 864 (N.J. 1985).
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New York granted a qualified protective order on the basis that the
defendant notify the physician "that the purpose of the [ex parte
interview] is to assist . . . in defense of a lawsuit brought by the
Plaintiff," and advise the physician that this court order "does not
compel her to participate. ,,223 These protections are nearly parallel to
those relied upon by the Smith COurt. 224 Therefore, this Comment
encourages future courts to adopt the logic of the Smith court in order
to best address and effectuate the privacy and cost concerns of
litigants.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior to HIPAA's 1996 enactment, more than a dozen states
explicitly permitted varying degrees of ex parte communication
between defense attorneys and plaintiffs' non-party treating
physicians. 225 In response to the growing need for greater patient
privacy, HHS and Congress promulgated the Privacy Rule in order to
better achieve HIPAA's ends.226 However, the debate over HIPAA
has continued nearly two decades after its enactment. 227 Without
question, HIP AA and the Privacy Rule altered the ex parte dynamic,
as demonstrated in cases such as Law and Crenshaw.228 Unlike the
pre-HIPAA time in which a defense attorney could speak freely with
a plaintiffs physician, the availability of informal discovery is no
longer a certainty.
HIP AA' s federal floor of privacy protection, combined with its
preemption scheme, supersedes any state law that fails to afford
patients minimum privacy protections. 229 However, just because
HIP AA preempts "less stringent" state discovery laws does not mean
that the informal practice of ex parte communication is extinct. Yes,
the "informal" nature has been removed from ex parte
communications, but the practice is very much alive and well. 230
Promulgated by HHS and Congress, the judicial proceedings

223.
224.

225.
226.
227.
237.
228.
229.
230.

Bayne v. Provost, 359 F. Supp. 2d 234, 243 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
Smith, 855 A.2d at 612 (citing Stemp1er v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857, 859-864) (N.I.
1985)); see supra note 210 and accompanying text.
Aripo/i, supra note 4, at 505-06.
See supra Part II.
See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts III, IV (citing Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705 (D. Md. 2004);
Crenshaw v. MONY Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015 (S.D. Cal. 2004)).
See supra Parts III, IV.
See supra Part lILA.
See supra Parts IV.B-C, V.
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exception to HIP AA and the Privacy Rule explicitly provide a
mechanism in which "formal" ex parte communication is
permissible.231 So long as the petitioning attorney satisfie.s the
requirements contained 45 C.P.R. § 164.512(e), there is a likelihood,
albeit not guaranteed, that ex parte communication will be ordered by
the court.
It is no longer necessary for the HIP AA debate to be stalled at the
crossroads of judicial interpretation, patient privacy, and fiduciary
concern. Under the plain language interpretation of HIP AA and the
Privacy Rule, combined with a balancing of state law, plaintiffs are
no longer permitted to utilize the statutes as both a sword and shield
to deflect defense counsel's requests for ex parte communication.232
Under the interpretation set forth in this Comment, both plaintiffs and
defendants now stand on equal footing with respect to ex parte
communication.
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